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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
The nature of the case is a declaratory relief action filed by Piercy pursuant to Idaho Code 
§ 10-1201, et seq., in which he challenged procedural irregularities in the creation of a herd 
district enacted by the Canyon County Board of Commissioners in 1982, some 23 years before 
the auto accident that gave rise to Guzman's lawsuit against Piercy and Sutton. 
The question presented by Piercy' s appeal is how long is too long to wait to challenge a 
herd district. Piercy takes the position that before the 2009 amendment to Idaho Code § 31-587, 
there was no statute of limitation to challenge a herd district, school district, or road district. The 
time frame for such a challenge, using his word, was "unlimited." 
Judge Ford agreed that the catch-all statute oflimitation, Idaho Code§ 5-224, applied to 
Piercy' s case before the Idaho Legislature amended Idaho Code § 31-587 in 2009 and gave the 
amendment retroactive effect. Whether this Court applies the four year statute oflimitation of 
Idaho Code § 5-224 or the retroactive seven year statute of limitation contained in Idaho Code § 
31-587 is irrelevant: under either statute Piercy's challenge to the 1982 herd district ordinance is 
too old. 
While Piercy makes much of the procedural irregularities in the ordinance's enactment, 
those irregularities are not really at issue in this appeal. The whole point of a statute of limitation 
is to prevent parties from having to litigate matters which, because of the passage of time, are 
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difficult, if not impossible, to litigate because of faded memories, dead or difficult to locate 
witnesses, and missing or degraded documentary evidence. 
Piercy never raised a word in protest to the 1982 herd district until he was sued in 2005 
for this car accident. The implications of a ruling in his favor in this appeal are significant, as 
such a ruling would invite civil and criminal defendants to defend their cases not on the merits, 
but by attacking the procedures by which laws which have applied to them for decades were 
enacted. 
B. Course of Proceedings. 
Sutton generally agrees with Piercy' s the course of proceedings described by Piercy, with 
some important qualifications. Sutton and Guzman have argued in favor of the validity of the 
1982 herd district from the beginning based on the notion that Piercy' s challenge to the district is 
too late. (See, e.g., R., Vol. 2, p. 283 (arguing Piercy's motion to void ordinance barred by 
doctrine of estoppel by laches); R., p. 210 (arguing applicability of quasi estoppel)). Sutton has 
argued throughout the life of the case that "[i]t is too late for Piercy, having benefited from the 
herd district status of Canyon County for 25 years, to now complain about alleged technical 
defects in the ordinance's passage because he finds himself in this unfortunate case." (R., Vol. 2, 
p. 287.) 
Because of the unique and complicated procedural posture of the case, neither Guzman 
nor Sutton had the opportunity to assert defenses under the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure until 
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the district court ordered Piercy to file a declaratory relief action against Canyon County. (See 
R., Vol. 4, p. 672, ifif 2 and 3.) The district court specifically approved the filing of the Amended 
Action for Declaratory Relief attached to his order as Exhibit A. (See R., Vol. 4, pp. 673-677.) 
That complaint specifically alleged there was a "justiciable controversy" between Piercy, Canyon 
County, Guzman, and Sutton over the "herd districts," (id., p. 677, if XV.), which included both 
the 1982 herd district from which Piercy's bull escaped and the 1908 herd district where the 
accident happened. Piercy challenged the validity of both herd districts. (Id., p. 677, prayer for 
relief, if 5.) 
Given the unique procedural posture of the case, the district court gave Canyon County, 
Guzman and Sutton the right to answer Piercy's complaint and assert all defenses under the 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. (See R., Vol. 4, p. 672, if 4.) 
Sutton and Guzman then pled one of the statute of limitations defenses (based on Idaho 
Code§ 5-224) that Judge Ford ultimately ruled barred Piercy's challenge to the 1982 and 1908 
herd districts. (R., Vol. 4, p. 702 (Guzman answer); R., Vol. 4, p. 718 (Sutton answer)). These 
answers, filed in 2008, did not assert Idaho Code § 31-587 as a statute of limitations defense 
since the amendment to that statute did not occur until the following year. 
Even though Sutton argued strenuously for application ofldaho Code § 5-224 to Judge 
Petrie in her post trial briefing (R., Vol. 5, pp. 911-920), Judge Petrie never made a ruling of any 
kind on the defense, and left the bench shortly after issuing his decision in the declaratory relief 
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action. (See R., Vol. 6, pp. 959-971.) Sutton and Guzman moved Judge Ford to reconsider the 
statute oflimitations defenses because Judge Petrie never addressed them, and Judge Ford 
granted the request on December 4, 2009, noting "this court finds that the statute of limitations 
argument has not been fully considered and decided by the court." (R., Vol. 6, p. 1147.) 
Sutton and Guzman argued the statutes of limitation on reconsideration, and Judge Ford 
considered the arguments, including the argument based on the 2009 amendment to Idaho Code § 
31-587, based on his authority under I.R.C.P. 1 l(a)(2)(B) to consider new facts and law in the 
process ofreconsidering "interlocutory orders entered by the court or its predecessor." (R., Vol. 
8, p. 1405.) 
C. Concise Statement of Facts. 
Sutton does not believe that the underlying facts - to the extent Piercy provides them - are 
of much relevance to the issues before this Court on appeal, as Piercy objects to application of 
the statutes of limitation found in Idaho Code § 31-587 and § 5-224 based solely on case law and 
statutory law. While Piercy primarily covers the procedural history, including the potential 
procedural irregularities behind enactment of the 1982 herd district, these facts do not answer the 
question of whether the statutes apply to bar Piercy's challenge to this two-plus decade old herd 
district. 
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It does not matter whether Piercy's challenge to the 1982 herd district ordinance was 
successful or not. The central point of Sutton's successful defense of that herd district is that 
Piercy brought the challenge too late, regardless of the merits of his challenge. 
As Piercy notes, the 1982 herd district was enacted by the Canyon County 
Commissioners, before Sutton and Guzman were born. Sutton and Guzman were high school 
students when the accident happened. Sutton, who got her drivers license in September 2002, 
frequently drove Wamstad Road, where the accident happened. (R., Vol. 2, p. 292, ifif 2 and 3.) 
She drove the road frequently at night. (Id.) Before the night of the accident she never saw any 
"Open Range" signs on Wamstad Road or cattle warning signs. (The yellow sign with the 
silhouette of a cow.) (Id., if 5.) She had driven extensively in other parts ofldaho and seen those 
signs, and understood them to mean that she needed to watch out for cattle. (Id., if 6.) Growing 
up in Parma she understood that cattle owners in her area of Canyon County had to keep their 
livestock fenced in. (Id., if 7.) The presence of Piercy's black bull on the road the night of the 
accident was a complete surprise to her. (Id., if 8.) 
Conversely, Piercy had farmed and ranched in Canyon County for 30 years. (Tr., p. 186, 
11. 17-19.) He had around 260 cows in 2005 when the accident occurred, and about 20 bulls. 
(Id., p. 187, 11. 12-16.) He farmed 450 acres at the time, and ranched another 340 acres. (Id., p. 
187, 11. 17-20.) 
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Although it is ultimately irrelevant to the statute of limitations arguments that the 
teenager Sutton knew that the area where the accident happened was a herd district, while the 
much older and experienced rancher Piercy claims he did not, these facts are provided to 
demonstrate to the Court that Piercy's testimony that he had no idea that he had lived in a herd 
district for 23 years when the accident occurred was very much open to question. 
II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The issue on appeal is whether Piercy's challenge to the 1982 herd district is barred by 
Idaho Code §§ 31-587 or 5-224. 
Sutton waives her cross appeal. 
III. ARGUMENT 
A. Standards of Review on Appeal 
1. Standard of Review for Grant of Summary Judgment Based on the Statute of 
Limitations. 
The determination of the applicable statute of limitation is a question of law over which 
the Court has free review. Farber v. Idaho State Ins. Fund, 153 Idaho 495, 497, 272 P.3d 467, 
469 (2012) (citations omitted). The factual findings upon which Judge Ford based his statute of 
limitations rulings are subject to the substantial evidence standard. Machado v. Ryan, 153 Idaho 
212, 217, 280 P.3d 715, 720 (2012). 1 
1Though, Piercy has not challenged these findings on appeal. 
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B. Analysis 
1. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion in Ruling that Guzman and 
Sutton Did Not Waive Their Statute of Limitations Defenses . 
Piercy argues that Sutton waived her statute of limitations by not timely asserting them 
and by stipulating to waive them. Both arguments fail, and overlook that the essence of all 
arguments made by Sutton and Guzman from the beginning of the case are time based. Quasi-
estoppel, laches, Idaho Code § 31-857, and Idaho Code § 5-224, are all based on the notion that 
Piercy's challenge is too late. 
Piercy is of course correct that a statute of limitations can be waived if not pled. See, e.g., 
Anderson v. State, 133 Idaho 788, 791, 992 P.2d 783, 786 (Ct. App. 1999). LR.C.P. 8(c) requires 
that a statute of limitations be pled as an affirmative defense. There is no dispute, however, that 
both Guzman and Sutton pled the defenses when given the opportunity by the district court. 
Judge Petrie ordered Piercy to file a declaratory action against Canyon County and permitted 
Sutton and Guzman to assert defenses under the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. (R., Vol. 4, p. 
672, if 4.) Because the defenses were pled, Piercy's waiver argument fails. 
With respect to Piercy's argument regarding the stipulation, the proper analysis of the 
issue is the trial court's authority to enter and interpret changes to its scheduling order under 
LR. C.P. 16(b ). While there are no cases under Rule 16(b) in the annotations, cases interpreting 
other provisions of Rule 16 review a trial court's rulings under an abuse of discretion standard. 
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See, e.g., Lloyd v. DeMott, 124 Idaho 62, 856 P.2d 99 (Ct.App. 1993) (holding that trial court did 
not abuse its discretion in limiting issues for trial under IRCP 16(c) and (d)(l)).2 
The parties stipulated to a schedule in the case on April 10 and 11, 2008.3 That 
stipulation, approved by Judge Petrie, set a deadline for amendments to pleadings of 120 days 
before trial, which was set for October 8, 2008. Accordingly, when Judge Petrie ordered Piercy 
to file a declaratory relief action against Canyon County on September 5, 2008 (R., Vol. 4, pp. 
671-672, ifif 1 and 2), it was necessary for the parties to agree that amendments to the pleadings 
after the amendment cut-off (which had long since passed) were permitted. Accordingly, in the 
September 4, 2008 Stipulation to Amend Pleadings and Scheduling, Sutton, Guzman and the 
County agreed to "waive any defenses they may have regarding the timing of the filing of Mr. 
Piercy's Amended Action for Declaratory Relief' (R., Vol. 4, p. 663, if 6), and Piercy agreed 
conversely that his opponents "may Answer the Amended Action for Declaratory Relief filed by 
Mr. Piercy as provided for in the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure." (R., Vol., p. 663, if 4.) 
Judge Ford appropriately exercised his discretion in ruling that Sutton and Guzman had 
not waived their statute oflimitations defenses by signing the stipulation. Judge Ford ruled that 
2The sequence of this Court's inquiry into abuse of discretion is: (1) whether the trial 
court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the trial court acted within 
the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to the 
specific choices available to it; and (3) whether the trial court reached its decision by an exercise 
ofreason. Sun Valley Shopping Ctr. v. Idaho Power, 119 Idaho 87, 94, 803 P.2d 993, 1000 
(1991). 
3Sutton will file a motion to augment the record with this scheduling order. 
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paragraph 4 of the stipulation was inconsistent with Piercy's position that Guzman and Sutton 
waived statute oflimitations defenses, as it gave them both the right to answer Piercy's amended 
declaratory relief complaint as provided for in the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. (R., Vol. 8, p. 
1404.) In the district court's words, "[p]aragraph 4 appears to be inconsistent with the assertion 
that the responding parties knowingly agreed not to assert a statute of limitations affirmative 
defense particularly in light of their vigorous assertion of other affirmative defenses including the 
estoppel arguments." (Id.) 
Additionally, Judge Ford noted that if the litigants had intended such a waiver, "the 
stipulation should have specifically stated that the respondents waive all statute of limitations 
defenses. (Id.) In other words, in the district court's view, the language Piercy relied upon was 
not specific enough to warrant the drastic remedy of finding that the defenses were waived.4 
Last, Piercy' s counsel in oral argument never rebutted that the undisputed purpose of the 
stipulation was to modify the existing scheduling orders and permit amendments to pleadings by 
both parties. By definition, and by its terms, the stipulation was never intended by any of the 
parties as a dismissal of previously asserted defenses or waiver of future defenses. Undersigned 
counsel provided the district court with additional information that the court considered in 
exercising its discretion: 
4Because all the arguments made by Sutton and Guzman were arguably time based -
including the estoppel and laches arguments - taken to its logical extreme, Piercy could argue 
that they waived all of their arguments in favor of the 1982 herd district. This, of course, was 
never their intent. 
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Clearly, a context of that stipulation was allowing them to amend, 
the cut-off for amendments to pleadings had already passed. And 
that was the whole reason for including that language in that 
stipulation to allow Mr. Piercy to amend so he could re-align the 
parties and set this up to make sense to the Supreme Court in case 
of us ending up there at some point in time in the future. 
I certainly never had any discussions with Mr. Peck about waiving 
the statute of limitations defense, that was never out there in 
anything we did, Your Honor. And there would have been no 
reason to have done that either, because we weren't in a position 
where we had to bargain that way. 
(Tr., p. 348, 11. 9-20.) 
Counsel for Guzman argued similarly, and counsel for Piercy admitted that the statute of 
limitations never specifically came up in discussions about the stipulation: 
Mr. Walton: Josh [Evett] is exactly right, and Ryan [Peck] will tell 
you, we never talked about statute of limitations in connection with 
that stipulation. Correct, Ryan? We never did. 
Mr. Peck: That term never came up. 
(Tr., p. 375, 11. 11-14.) 
Judge Ford acted well within his discretion in finding that Sutton and Guzman did not 
waive their statute of limitations defenses by signing the stipulation. There was no reason for 
either to waive those defenses. The purpose of the stipulation was to modify Judge Petrie's 
scheduling order and permit amendments that were technically untimely under that scheduling 
order. Furthermore, the stipulation and order expressly gave Sutton and Guzman the right to 
plead their defenses, which they did. 
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2. Guzman and Sutton Were Entitled to Defend Canyon County's Herd District 
Ordinance. 
Piercy argues that Guzman and Sutton "have no standing" to argue that the 1982 herd 
district is valid. See Appellant's Brief, p. 17. This is an odd position to take, as Piercy, in his 
Amended Action for Declaratory Relief, alleged there was a "justiciable controversy" under 
Idaho Code§§ 10-1202 and 10-1203 between Piercy, the County, Guzman and Sutton. (R., Vol. 
4, p. 681, if XV.) 
Piercy makes this two page argument without a single citation to case or statutory law. 
Usually, a party's failure to cite any authority for its position would result in the issue being 
waived. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. of Idaho v. Eisenman, 153 Idaho 549, 286 P.3d 185 (2012), 
citing State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996) (citations omitted) (holding 
that issues "not supported by propositions oflaw, authority, or argument ... " are waived "if either 
authority or argument is lacking, not just if both are lacking.") 
Piercy must do better than simply state a conclusion. Because he has not provided this 
Court with authority for his argument, it is waived. 
Assuming the argument is not waived, Idaho Code § 10-1202 gives Sutton the right to 
argue in favor of preservation of the 1982 herd district. The statute reads as follows: 
10-1202. PERSON INTERESTED OR AFFECTED MAY 
HAVE DECLARATION. Any person interested under a deed, 
will, written contract or other writings constituting a contract or 
any oral contract, or whose rights, status or other legal relations are 
affected by a statute, municipal ordinance, contract or franchise, 
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may have determined any question of construction or validity 
arising under the instrument, statute, ordinance, contract or 
franchise and obtain a declaration of rights, status or other legal 
relations thereunder. 
Idaho Code§ 10-1202 (Emphasis added.). 
In the same way that the Idaho Legislature has given Piercy the legal right to challenge 
the 1982 herd district, it has given Sutton the legal right to argue that the 1982 herd district 
ordinance is "valid." Sutton's "rights" and "legal relations" are clearly at issue. If the 1982 herd 
district is upheld, she will be able to ask the jury to find that Piercy is liable in some amount for 
the injuries to Guzman. If the herd district is struck down, Piercy intends to argue that neither 
Guzman or Sutton can argue that he bears fault for the accident. 
There are three problems with Piercy's argument that neither Sutton or Guzman have 
"standing" to argue in favor or the 1982 herd district. See Appellant's Brief, p. 17. 
First, Piercy has provided this Court with no authority for his argument. His brief does 
not cite a case, statute, or rule of procedure providing that a litigant in Sutton's position has no 
"standing" to argue in favor of an ordinance. The Idaho Appellate Rules provide that "[t]he 
argument shall contain the contentions of the appellant with respect to the issues presented on 
appeal, the reasons therefor, with citations to authorities, statutes and parts of the transcript and 
the record relied upon." I.A.R. 35(a)(6). If an appellant does not "assert his assignments of error 
with particularity and to support his position with sufficient authority, those assignments of error 
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are too indefinite to be heard by the Court." Bach v. Bagley, 148 Idaho 784, 790, 229 P.3d 1146, 
1152 (2010) (citation omitted). Piercy's "standing" argument fails these simply requirements. 
Second, there is no basis to modify Idaho Code§ 10-1202, which unambiguously grants 
"any" person whose "rights" or "legal relations" are affected by an ordinance to obtain a 
declaration of rights. Piercy's argument essentially is that the district court could only consider 
Canyon County's arguments in deciding whether the 1982 herd district is valid. By its plain 
language, however, Idaho Code§ 10-1202 does not limit the right to obtain a declaration of 
rights to the governmental entity whose ordinance is in question. If a statute is not ambiguous, 
this Court does not construe it, but simply follows the law as written." Verska v. St. Alphonsus 
Reg'! Med Ctr., 151 Idaho 889, 893, 265 P.3d 502, 505 (2011). Accordingly, this Court is 
constrained by Idaho Code § 10-1202, and Verska, to hold that Sutton has the right to argue in 
favor of the 1982 herd district's validity. 
Third, and putting aside that she has standing by way of Idaho Code § 10-1202, Sutton 
has standing under this Court's standing analysis. The doctrine of standing focuses on the party 
seeking relief and not on the issues the party wishes to have adjudicated. Miles v. Idaho Power 
Co., 16 Idaho 635, 641, 778 P.2d 757, 763 (1989), citing Valley Forge College v. Americans 
United, 454 U.S. 464, 102 S.Ct. 752, 70 L.Ed.2d 700 (1982). 
The essence of the standing inquiry is whether the party seeking to invoke the court's 
jurisdiction has "alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure the 
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concrete adversariness which sharpens the presentation upon which the court so depends for 
illumination of difficult constitutional questions." This requirement of "personal stake" has 
come to be understood to require not only a "distinct palpable injury" to the plaintiff, but also a 
"fairly traceable" causal connection between the claimed injury and the challenged conduct. 
(Citations omitted.) Miles, 116 Idaho at 641, 778 P.2d at 763, citing Duke Power Co. v. 
Carolina Env. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 72, 98 S.Ct. 2620, 2630, 57 L.Ed.2d 595 (1978). 
Thus, to satisfy the case or controversy requirement of standing, litigants generally must 
allege or demonstrate an injury in fact and a substantial likelihood that the judicial relief 
requested will prevent or redress the claimed injury. Miles, 116 Idaho at 641, 778 P.2d at 763 
(citation omitted). 
Sutton has a "personal stake" in the dispute over the validity of the 1982 herd district 
ordinance. If the ordinance stands she can argue that Piercy is at fault for the accident. If the 
ordinance is struck down, Piercy will argue that as a matter of law he has no fault and is entitled 
to dismissal from the case. There is no dispute that one purpose of a herd district is to protect 
motorists and their passengers from livestock. Piercy argues that the 1982 herd district ordinance 
was void, and he accordingly had no duty to keep his livestock off of area roadways. Suttons' 
Volkswagen was totaled and her friends were badly injured. Piercy takes the position that he 
bears no fault for his black bull standing in the middle of Wamstad Road on a dark night. 
Sutton's "stake" in this litigation could not be more concrete and "personal." 
-14-
She has standing to argue in favor of the 1982 herd district ordinance. 
3. Idaho Code § 5-224 is a Catch-All Statute of Limitations that Applies to 
Declaratory Relief Actions in the Event§ 31-587 Does Not Apply. 
Piercy takes the district court to task for its ruling that Idaho Code § 5-224 applies 
to challenges to herd districts. See Appellant's Brief, p. 18. Piercy claims that because Idaho 
Code§ 31-587 is "more specific," Judge Ford's ruling regarding Idaho Code§ 5-224 is error. 
The argument is not fair to Judge Ford's decision, in which he explained that "[i]f it is 
determined upon appellate review that the statute oflimitations set forth in Idaho Code§ 31-587 
does not apply to the facts of this case, this court concludes that as a civil action, declaratory 
actions fall within the "catch all" statute oflimitations provision ofldaho Code§ 5-224." (R., p. 
1412.) Hence, the accusation that Judge Ford's ruling on Idaho Code§ 5-224 is in error because 
there is a more "specific statute" is misplaced, as Judge Ford recognized that the 2009 
amendment to Idaho Code § 31-587 provides the specific statute oflimitations. Because Piercy 
argued that the 2009 amendment was invalid because it was not retroactive and was 
unconstitutional, Judge Ford made an alternative ruling on Idaho Code§ 5-224 so that the case 
would not have to be remanded to him for further proceedings in the event Piercy was successful 
in his appeal. 
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To the extent Piercy's point appears to be that only the pre-2009 version ofldaho Code § 
31-587 could contain a statute of limitations,5 and that because it did not Idaho Code § 5-224 has 
therefore never applied to challenges to the creation of herd districts, he is incorrect. The pre-
2009 version set forth a presumption of validity of creation or dissolution of various types of 
districts. See Appellant's Brief, p. 19, citing Idaho Code§ 31-587 (1989 version). This version 
of the statute provided that the presumption "shall be a rule of evidence in all courts in the state 
ofldaho." (Id.) 
There is no language in the pre-2009 version of Idaho Code § 31-587 that can be 
construed as a statute oflimitations, nor can the statute's silence be construed as a legislative 
command that Idaho Code § 5-224, the catch-all statute of limitations, did not apply. 
This Court has held repeatedly in the recent past that courts do not have the authority to 
construe unambiguous statutes. They must be applied "as written," whether a court likes the 
result or not. Verska, 151 Idaho at 893 265 P.2d at 505.6 The pre-2009 version ofldaho Code§ 
31-587 does not contain a statute oflimitations. Accordingly, Piercy's argument that the more 
5Piercy writes, "Idaho Code § 31-857, prior to 2009, did not include a statute of limitation 
that acted as a complete bar to an action." Appellant's Brief, p. 19. 
6Piercy's argument that the Statement of Purpose to the 2009 amendments is somehow 
relevant to the issue presented is meritless. See Appellant's Brief, p. 20. No one disputes that 
these amendments created a statute of limitations in Idaho Code § 31-587. By no stretch of the 
imagination, however, does either that amendment or the statute's silence on a statute of 
limitations before that amendment mean that only Idaho Code § 31-587 could have contained a 
statute oflimitations before 2009, and that because it didn't there was no statute oflimitations 
before then. 
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specific language of the pre-2009 Idaho Code§ 31-587 prevails over the general language of 
Idaho Code § 5-224 fails. 
As determined by Judge Ford, if Piercy successfully argues that Idaho Code§ 31-587 
does not apply, he must still contend with the plain language ofldaho Code§ 5-224. 
Assuming that Idaho Code§ 31-587 does not apply, the argument that Idaho Code§ 5-
224 still bars Piercy from challenging the validity of the 1982 herd district ordinance is a simple 
one, based on the plain meaning of the relevant statutes. 
The limitations of action statutes apply to all actions and special proceedings. The 
declaratory judgment action constitutes a type of "action" limited by Idaho Code§§ 5-224. 
Idaho Code § 5-201 sets forth the general statute of limitations provision: 
Civil actions can only be commenced within the periods prescribed 
in this chapter after the cause of action shall have accrued, except 
when, in special cases, a different limitation is prescribed by statute. 
Idaho Code § 5-201. There is no specific statute of limitations that applies to either a declaratory 
judgment action, or to the underlying claim, therefore, the catchall provision applies. 
Idaho Code § 5-224 is the catchall statute of limitations provision, which provides: 
An action for relief not hereinbefore provided for must be 
commenced within four ( 4) years after the cause of action shall have 
accrued. 
Idaho Code § 5-224. 
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There is only one form of action in Idaho's civil courts: the "civil action." See I.R.C.P. 
2. An "action" is further defined in Title 5, Chapter 2 to mean: 
The word "action" as used in this chapter is to be construed, 
whenever it is necessary so to do, as including a special proceeding 
of a civil nature. 
Idaho Code § 5-240. 
An action seeking declaratory judgment is authorized pursuant to Rule 57 of the Idaho 
Rules of Civil Procedure and Title 10, Chapter 12, Idaho Code, and constitutes "[a ]n action for 
relief ... " under Idaho Code§ 5-224. Rule 57 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure states that 
the Rules of Civil Procedure apply to declaratory judgment actions. A declaratory relief claim is 
an "action;" the Supreme Court ofldaho has recognized this in writing "[t]his is a civil action, 
albeit for a declaratory judgment." Smith v. State Board of Medicine of Idaho, 74 Idaho 191, 
194, 259 P.2d 1033, 1034 (1953). Furthermore, this Court awarded attorney's fees in favor of a 
plaintiff in a declaratory judgment action under Idaho Code § 12-120(3), which statute allows for 
the recovery of attorney fees in "any civil action."7 Freiburger v. J-U-B Engineers, Inc., 141 
Idaho 415, 423-424, 111P.3d100, 108-109 (2005). 
7Idaho Code§ 12-120(3) states, in pertinent part: 
In any civil action to recover on ... any commercial transaction unless otherwise 
provided by law, the prevailing party shall be allowed a reasonable attorney's fee 
to be set by the court, to be taxed and collected as costs ... (emphasis added.) 
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Based on the above, Piercy's declaratory judgment action is a "civil action" under Idaho 
Code§ 5-201 and "an action for relief ... " subject to the limitations set forth under Idaho Code § 
5-224. 
Where there is no fraud shown, neither the ignorance of a person of his rights to bring an 
action, nor the mere silence of a person liable to the action, prevents the running of the statute of 
limitations. Coe v. Sloan, 16 Idaho 49, 100 P. 354, 355 (1909). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has set forth the policy underlying statutes of limitation: 
"The policy behind statutes of limitations is protection of 
defendants against stale claims, and protection of the courts against 
needless expenditures ofresources." Johnson v. Pischke, 108 Idaho 
397, 402, 700 P.2d 19, 25 (1985). Statutes of limitation are 
designed to promote stability and avoid uncertainty with regards to 
future litigation. 
Wadsworth v. Department ofTransp., 128 Idaho 439, 442, 915 P.2d 1, 4 (1996). Additional 
policy reasons for the imposition of statutory time limits for filing actions are set forth in Renner 
v. Edwards: 
It is eminently clear that statutes of limitations were intended to 
prevent the unexpected enforcement of stale claims concerning 
which persons interested have been thrown off their guard for want 
of seasonable prosecution. They are, to be sure, a bane to those 
who are neglectful or dilatory in the prosecution of their legal 
rights. 1 Wood, Limitation of Actions, § 4, p. 8. As a statute of 
repose, they afford parties needed protection against the necessity 
of defending claims which, because of their antiquity, would place 
the defendant at a grave disadvantage. In such cases how resolutely 
unfair it would be to award one who has willfully or carelessly 
slept on his legal rights an opportunity to enforce an unfresh claim 
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against a party who is left to shield himself from liability with 
nothing more than tattered or faded memories, misplaced or 
discarded records, and missing or deceased witnesses. Indeed, in 
such circumstances, the quest for truth might elude even the wisest 
court. The statutes are predicated on the reasonable and fair 
presumption that valid claims which are of value are not usually 
left to gather dust or remain dormant for long periods of time. 
Riddlesbarger v. Hartford Ins. Co., 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 386, 19 L.Ed. 
257; 1 Wood, Limitation of Actions, supra,§ 4; Spath v. Morrow, 
supra (174 Neb. 38, 115 N.W.2d 581). To those who are unduly 
tardy in enforcing their known rights, the statute of limitations 
operates to extinguish the remedies; in effect, their right ceases to 
create a legal obligation and in lieu thereof a moral obligation may 
arise in the aid of which courts will not lend their assistance. Cf. 34 
Am.Jur., 'Limitation of Actions,' § 11, p. 20. 
Renner v. Edwards, 93 Idaho 836, 838-839, 475 P.2d 530, 532 - 533 (1969), citing Wood v. 
Carpenter, 101U.S.135, 25 L.Ed. 807 (1879). 
Under Idaho Code§ 5-224, an action "must be commenced within four (4) years after the 
cause of action shall have accrued." In this case, the cause of action accrued the date the herd 
district ordinance went into effect in 1982. 
The Idaho Supreme Court holds that the statute of limitations in a case where the validity 
of an ordinance is challenged begins to accrue the date of the ordinance's passage. Canady v. 
Coeur d'Alene Lumber Co., 21 Idaho 77, 120 P. 830, 831 (1911). 
In Canady the Supreme Court held that the statute of limitations barred an action to 
declare an ordinance null and void filed nine years after the ordinance's enactment. Id. In 
Canady, the city of Coeur d'Alene enacted two ordinances in 1900, and another ordinance in 
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19058, generally for the purpose of vacating certain streets and alleys in the city, with the 
understanding that the Coeur d'Alene Lumber Company would establish and maintain a sawmill, 
planing mill and lumber yard on the vacated streets. Id. Thereafter, the Coeur d'Alene Lumber 
Company expended funds to build the lumber manufacturing establishment. Id. at 830. Plaintiff 
had notice of the enactment of the ordinances and the expenditure of money in the construction 
of the plant and did not object at that time. Id. 
Plaintiff's husband owned certain lands bordering on or near the streets vacated by the 
ordinances. Id. at 832. At some point, plaintiff succeeded to the interest of her husband and 
brought action on June 15, 1909, to have the ordinances vacating the streets and alleys declared 
null and void, to compel the defendants to remove obstructions from the streets vacated by the 
ordinances, to enjoin the defendants from obstructing the streets in the future, and for damages. 
Id. at 831. Defendants answered the complaint and denied that plaintiff was damaged by the 
street vacation, denied that plaintiffs land was within the city limits, and asserted the statute of 
limitations and estoppel. Id. at 832. 
At the close of plaintiff's evidence, defendants moved for a non-suit, which was granted 
by the court. Id. at 832. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the district court and held, 
in part, that plaintiff's action was barred by the statute of limitations. Id. at 830. In support of its 
decision, the Court concluded: 
80rdinance No. 71 was approved March 10, 1900; No. 75 was approved November 6, 
1900; and No. 115 was approved March 29, 1905. 
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We think, under the facts of this case, that this action is barred by 
the statute of limitations: and that this action should have been 
brought at least within five years from the date such cause of action 
arose. We think it sufficiently appears that appellant sat by when 
Ordinances Nos. 71 and 75 were passed in 1900, and more than 
nine years before this action was commenced, and made no 
complaint of any damages having been sustained to her property by 
reason of said ordinances and the vacation of the streets. And, 
again, in 1905, when Ordinance No. 115 was passed, she made no 
protest or objection of any kind. She knew that the Coeur d'Alene 
Lumber Company was expending a great deal of money in 
establishing its lumber plant upon said blocks and a portion of one 
of the streets, and made no protest of any kind whatever to the city, 
and made no claim for damages to her property as resulting from 
the passage of said ordinances. The first time she complained of 
damage to her property, so far as the record shows, was when she 
commenced this action, June 15, 1909. Howard Co. v. Chicago & 
A. R. Co., 130 Mo. 652. 32 S. W. 651; City of Logansport v. Uhl, 
99 Ind. 531, 49 Am. Rep. 109. 
Id. at 83 5 (emphasis added). 
Under Canady, Piercy' s challenge to the 1982 herd district ordinance is barred by the 
statute of limitations. The Order Establishing Herd District was enacted December 10, 1982, 
nearly 23 years before this action was commenced. Piercy did not raise this issue until after 
Guzman filed a Complaint against Piercy for damages arising from the collision between 
Sutton's vehicle and Piercy's black bull. Prior to the subject accident, Piercy never complained 
of any damages sustained by reason of the herd district ordinance. 
The purpose of statutes of limitations is to prevent litigation of stale claims. See 
Wadsworth v. Department ofTransp., 128 Idaho 439, 442, 915 P.2d 1, 4 (1996); Renner v. 
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Edwards, 93 Idaho 836, 838, 475 P.2d 530, 532 (1969). Whether Piercy likes it or not - and in 
spite of his evidentiary showings - the Idaho Legislature has deemed his challenge to the 1982 
herd district as stale. 
There are strong policy reasons supporting statute of limitations provisions for actions 
attacking the validity of an ordinance based upon alleged irregularities in the ordinance's 
passage. At some point an ordinance has to have finality. If ordinances can be attacked at 
anytime based on procedural irregularities, without limitation as to time, then the door is open to 
anyone to attack any ordinance no matter how old and no matter how much evidence has been 
lost to time. There is no policy rationale supporting turning over a now 25+ year old ordinance 
on grounds of procedural irregularity. After the passage of so much time, these types of issues 
are a waste of judicial economy and resources. 
4. Idaho Code§ 31-857 Applies Retroactively to Prevent Challenges to Herd 
Districts Decades After Their Enactment. 
As Judge Ford noted, the 2009 amendment to Idaho Code§ 31-587 occurred after Judge 
Petrie's initial decision but before a final judgment was entered. Accordingly, Judge Ford 
considered the amendment and "new evidence" in the process of "reconsidering interlocutory 
orders entered by the court or its predecessors." (R., p. 1405.) Piercy has not challenged Judge 
Ford's power to consider new law and new evidence under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 
1 l(a)(2)(B). 
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Rather, Piercy claims that the amendment only operatives prospectively from its effective 
date, and argues that the amendment is not retroactive. See Appellant's Brief, p. 21. To the 
extent that Piercy relies on legislative history to attempt to avoid the plain language of Idaho 
Code § 31-587 (see, e.g., Appellant's Brief, p. 21 (noting no indication in minutes that the 
amendments were retroactive); pp. 21-22 (arguing that Statement of Purpose's use of word 
"establishes" proves amendment is prospective); and p. 23 (arguing that Legislature could have 
expressed retroactivity in various different ways)) he again violates the central point of Verska, 
supra, that courts cannot construe unambiguous statutes. 
As Judge Ford found, the 2009 amendment to Idaho Code § 31-587 is unambiguous. It is 
retroactive and prevents challenging various types of districts once they are older than 7 years. 
(R., Vol. 8, p. 1410 (finding a "literal reading of the plain language of the statute confirms ... 
[retroactive application]"). 
Idaho Code§ 73-101 states "[n]o part of these compiled laws is retroactive, unless 
expressly so declared." Idaho Code § 73-101. "[A] statute is not applied retroactively unless 
there is 'clear legislative intent to that effect.'" Gailey v. Jerome County, 113 Idaho 430, 432, 
745 P.2d 1051, 1053 (1987). A statute may also be applied retroactively where intent is "clearly 
implied" by the language of the statute. Kent v. Idaho Public Utilities Commission, 93 Idaho 
618, 621, 469 P.2d 745, 748 (1970). 
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It has long been held by the Idaho Supreme Court that a statute does not have to use the 
word "retroactive" to evidence clear legislative intent: 
We think it is sufficient if the enacting words are such that the 
intention to make the law retroactive is clear. In other words, if the 
language clearly refers to the past as well as to the future, then the 
intent to make the law retroactive is expressly declared within the 
meaning of [Idaho Code§ 73-101]. 
Peavy v. McCombs, 26 Idaho 143, 151, 140 P. 965, 968 (1914). 
Since its original enactment in 1935, Idaho Code § 31-857 has included language making 
it applicable to orders of the board of county commissioners made prior to and after the statute's 
enactment: 
Whenever any school district, road district, herd district, or other 
district has heretofore been, or shall hereafter be, declared to be 
created, established, disestablished, dissolved, or modified, by an 
order of the board of county commissioners in any county of the 
State of Idaho, a legal prima facie presumption is hereby declared 
to exist, after a lapse of five years from the date of such order, that 
all proceedings and jurisdictional steps preceding the making of 
such order have been properly and regularly taken so as to warrant 
said board in making said order, and the burden of proof shall rest 
upon the party who shall deny, dispute, or question the validity of 
said order to show that any of such preceding proceedings or 
jurisdictional steps were not properly or regularly taken; and such 
prima facie presumption shall be a rule of evidence in all courts in 
the State ofldaho. 
1935 Idaho Sess. Laws ch. 79, § 1, p.134 (emphasis added). 
The statute was subsequently amended in 1989 and in 2009. The 2009 amendment added 
the following: "No challenge to the proceedings or jurisdictional steps preceding such an order, 
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shall be heard or considered after seven (7) years has lapsed from the date of the order." Idaho 
Code§ 31-857; see also, 2009 Idaho Sess. Laws ch. 43, § 1, p. 124-125. 
Because the original 1935 version ofldaho Code § 31-857 expressly applied to certain 
orders passed by the county commissioners prior to the effective date of the statute, so too does 
the 2009 amendment. See Stuartv. State, 149 Idaho 35, 43-44, 232 P.3d 813, 822 (2010) 
(because original enactment of statute included language making it applicable to convictions 
prior to the statute's enactment, Court concluded retroactive language applied to amendments.) 
To interpret the amendment as not applying retroactively would have the effect of nullifying the 
retroactive language in the pre-2009 statute, which this Court does not permit. See Stuart, 149 
Idaho at 44, 232 P.3d at 822. 
The analysis under Stuart is really no different than the analysis of Verska. If the pre-
2009 version of Idaho Code § 31-587 applied to orders entered before its effective date, then so it 
is with respect to the 2009 amendments. 
The plain language of the amended Idaho Code § 31-587 controls. It provides: 
"Whenever any school district, road district, herd district, or other district has heretofore been, or 
shall hereafter be, declared to be created, established, disestablished, dissolved, or modified, by 
an order of the board of county commissions in any county of the state ofldaho .... No 
challenge to the proceedings or jurisdictional steps preceding such an order, shall be heard or 
considered after seven (7) years has lapsed from the date of the order." (Emphasis added.) 
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By its terms the new Idaho Code § 31-587 applies to districts "heretofore" or "hereafter" 
created. By its terms it applies to districts in existence before the 2009 amendment, and those 
created after the 2009 amendment, just as the 193 5 version of the statute applied to districts 
already in existence. The statute oflimitation now specified at the end of the statute plainly 
provides that it applies to districts created by an order either before or after the 2009 amendment. 
The statute is retroactive and applies to Piercy's case. 
The enactment of the statute of limitations is to preclude challenges to old districts, and 
can only be read to apply retroactively. Many districts, like the herd district at issue in this case, 
were established twenty-five plus years ago, and society has ordered itself around the existence 
of these districts. To assert the statute oflimitations only applies to districts created after July 1, 
2009, does not make sense when the purpose of the amendment is to preclude challenges to old 
districts. It was not the legislature's intent to grant another seven years to challenge procedural 
defects in a one hundred year old herd district statute - such interpretation would not solve the 
problem sought to be fixed by the amendment to Idaho Code§ 31-8579• 
Piercy' s reliance on University of Utah Hosp. on Behalf of Harris v. Pence, 104 Idaho 
172, 657 P.2d 469 (1983), is misplaced. First, the case is distinguishable on its facts since the 
statute at issue in that case (Idaho Code § 31-3 504) was not expressly retroactive, unlike Idaho 
Code § 31-857, which applies to districts "heretofore" or "hereafter" created. 
9This absurd result is precisely what Piercy seeks here, as he has repeatedly challenged 
the validity of the 1908 herd district where the accident in this case occurred. 
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Additionally, the University of Utah case involved a situation where a statute of limitation 
(Idaho Code § 31-3504) was reduced following the accrual of a medical indigency claim. In that 
case the statute of limitation was changed from within one year of "discharge" from a hospital to 
45 days "following the admission" of a person to a hospital. University of Utah, 104 Idaho at 
174. In the instant matter there was no reduction of the statute oflimitations. Before the 
amendment to Idaho Code§ 31-857 in 2009, the catch all statute oflimitation of four years 
applied. See Idaho Code § 5-224. The 2009 amendment increased the statute of limitation of 
four years to seven years. 
Accordingly, the concern of University of Utah - shrinking a statute of limitation on an 
accrued claim in the absence of express retroactive language - is simply not present here. The 
case is inapposite, unless one accepts Piercy' s drastic claim that the statute of limitation for 
challenging herd districts before the 2009 amendment was "unlimited." See Appellant's Brief, p. 
23. 
Last, Piercy's argument that the effective date of the 2009 amendment to§ 31-587 
demonstrates it is not retroactive is flawed. See Appellant's Brief, p. 25, citing Woodland 
Furniture, LLC v. Larsen, 142 Idaho 140, 146, 124 P .3d 1016, 1022 (2003). First, the viability 
of Woodland Furniture's holding that the "effective date" of legislation is a demonstration of 
intent is questionable given this Court's 2011 holding in Verska, supra, that the plain language of 
the statute controls. A statute's effective date is not part of the statute itself. Accordingly, under 
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Verska, it is of no use in the interpretation of an unambiguous statute. Furthermore, implicit in 
the holding of Woodland Furniture is the position that a statute intended to be retroactive would 
have an effective date prior to when the statute actually became effective. This logical 
impossibility weighs in favor of affirming the central holding of Verska that plain statutory 
language controls. 
Additionally, Woodland Furniture is inapplicable because retroactive effect is expressed 
in the first sentence of Idaho Code § 31-5 87. The 2009 amendment applies to orders 
"heretofore" or "hereafter" created, just as the original 1935 version of the statute applied to 
districts already in existence. 
Based on the foregoing, the statute of limitations in Idaho Code § 31-857 applies to this 
case, and Piercy is barred from challenging the order establishing the 1982 herd district. 
5. Whether Piercy's Challenge to the Herd District is in the Form of a Claim or 
Affirmative Defense Should not Matter, as the Ultimate Issue (is the District 
Valid) Remains the Same. 
Piercy argues that statutes of limitation do not "apply to pure defenses," and apply only 
where affirmative relief is sought. See Appellant's Brief, p. 25, citing Morton v. Whitson, 45 
Idaho 28, 260 P. 426 (1927). 
Putting aside the holding in Morton, Piercy overlooks that his challenge to the 1982 herd 
district ordinance is in the nature of a claim for affirmative relief. Piercy seeks a judgment that 
the 1982 herd district is invalid, and that accordingly the area from which his black bull escaped 
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reverts to open range and he has no liability, as a matter oflaw, for the accident. This is 
"affirmative relief' in every sense of the phrase. Piercy' s declaratory relief action is a "civil 
action" as defined by I.R.C.P. 2. I.R.C.P. 8(a)(l) requires a pleading setting forth a "claim for 
relief," which Piercy has done. 
Piercy is not a defendant with respect to the challenge to the 1982 herd district. He is the 
Plaintiff, as he is the one challenging the validity of the law. He has asserted claims, not 
defenses. 
Morton appears to stand for the simple proposition that a plaintiff who sues a defendant 
cannot defend an affirmative defense asserted by the defendant based on the statute of 
limitations. Statutes oflimitations apply to claims, such as Piercy's claim challenging the 
validity of the 1982 herd district. 
The other arguments made by Piercy in III. A. 5. of his brief are unavailing. 
Freiberger v. J-U-B Engineers, Inc., 141Idaho415, 111P.3d100 (2005) and Smith v. 
State Board of Medicine, 74 Idaho 191, 259 P.2d1033 (1953), were both cited by Judge Ford to 
support his conclusion that a declaratory action is a civil action. That being the case, Judge Ford 
found that Idaho Code § 5-224 applies to actions for declaratory relief. Piercy's faulting of Judge 
Ford for relying on these cases (see, e.g., R., Vol. 8, p. 1412) is misplaced, as Judge Ford relied 
on them for nothing more than the simple proposition that declaratory actions are "civil actions." 
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Hayden Lake Fire Protection Dist. v. Alcorn, 141Idaho388, 11 P.3d 73 (2005), cited at 
p. 28 of Appellant's Brief, supports Sutton's position, as it upheld application of a statute of 
limitations in a declaratory relief action. 
In/anger v. City of Salmon, 137 Idaho 45, 44 P.3d 1100 (2002), cited at p. 28 of 
Appellant's brief, is inapposite, as it dealt with the unique situation of whether a statute of 
limitations applies to a city's unlawful conveyance of a portion of a city street. This Court has 
long held that no statute oflimitations applies to a city's unlawful attempt to convey a portion of 
a city street. In/anger, 13 7 Idaho at 50, citing Boise City v. Wilkinson, l 6 Idaho 150, 102 P. 148 
(1909). This rule is based on the Court's decades old holdings in many cases that city streets are 
public and "held by the municipality in trust for the use of the public." In/anger, 137 Idaho at 49. 
In/anger did not hold that "the statute oflimitations does not apply to the challenge of the 
validity of an ordinance." Appellant's Brief, p. 28. The case does not come close to a holding 
that general. It is specifically limited to city streets. 
Similarly, McCuskey v. Canyon County, 123 Idaho 657, 851P.2d953 (1992), does not 
say that statutes of limitation do not apply to challenges to herd districts, or any other type of 
district. No statute of limitations defense was asserted in that case. The issue was not before this 
Court. While it is true that this Court in McCuskey held that county zoning ordinances enacted 
without complying with state enabling statutes are "ineffectual" and "void," this Court did not 
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address the issue presented by this case: At what point does a county resident lose the right to 
challenge a herd district based on alleged procedural flaws in its enactment? 
Idaho Code§ 31-857 now explicitly recognizes that, before seven years elapses, a 
resident can challenge "all proceedings and jurisdictional steps preceding the making of such 
order .... " After seven years, however, "[n]o challenge ... shall be heard or considered .... " 
The Idaho Legislature has made a decision that, in spite of procedural irregularities in the 
passage of a school, road, herd, or other district, after seven years those districts are beyond 
challenge. Piercy has submitted no authority to this Court for the proposition that the Legislature 
cannot do this. The Court must consider the implications of Piercy' s arguments, as he is 
essentially claiming that under this Court's precedents the Idaho Legislature cannot place a 
statute of limitations on challenges to procedural irregularities in the passage of a herd or other 
district. If the Idaho Legislature has required the completion of various procedural steps to enact 
a herd district, certainly it can set a time limit for challenges to those districts. Piercy cannot, on 
the one hand, demand strict compliance with the Legislature's herd district requirements but then 
attack the Legislature's restrictions on challenges to the creation of those districts. He must take 
the good with the bad. 
Both Idaho Code§ 31-857 and, in the alternative, Idaho Code§ 5-224, set a limit on the 
time in which a county resident can challenge procedural irregularities in the enactment of a herd 
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district. McCuskey never addressed the applicability of a statute of limitation. It is, accordingly, 
not on point. 
6. The 2009 Amendment to Idaho Code§ 31-857 is Constitutional. 
Piercy argues that retroactive application ofldaho Code § 31-857 violates his procedural 
due process rights, as he "has an interest in being able to have his cattle roam in open range 
without being subject to liability for accidents caused if his cattle wander onto the roadway." 
Appellant's Brief, p. 30. 
There is no merit to this novel argument. Piercy cites no authority for the position that 
retroactive application of a statute of limitations is a procedural due process violation. 
Furthermore, Piercy has no cognizable property right, and he had ample opportunity before the 
accident involving his bull to challenge the herd district. He did not. 
a. Statutory Construction. 
The constitutionality of a statute is a question of law over which this Court exercises free 
review. Stuart v. State, 149 Idaho 35, 40, 232 P.3d 813, 818 (2010) (additional citations 
omitted). The party challenging a statute on constitutional grounds bears the burden of 
establishing that the statute is unconstitutional and "must overcome a strong presumption of 
validity." Doe Iv. Doe, 138 Idaho 893, 903, 71P.3d1040, 1050 (2003) (additional citations 
omitted). Every reasonable presumption must be indulged in favor of the constitutionality of a 
statute. State v. Pontier, 95 Idaho 707, 711, 518 P.2d 969, 973 (1974) (additional citations 
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omitted). The legislature is presumed to have acted within its constitutional power. Worthen v. 
State, 96 Idaho 175, 179, 525 P.2d 957, 961 (1974) (additional citations omitted). 
The party challenging a statute on constitutional grounds must show the statute is 
unconstitutional "on its face" or "as applied." Am. Falls Reservoir Dist. No. 2 v. Idaho Dept. 
Water Res., 143 Idaho 862, 870, 154 P.3d 433, 441 (2007) (additional citations omitted). A 
facial challenge requires a showing that the statute in question is unconstitutional in all 
applications and is purely a question of law. Id. (additional citations omitted). By contrast, an 
"as applied" challenge requires a showing that the statute is unconstitutional as applied to the 
offending conduct. Id. (Additional citations omitted). 
It appears Piercy is solely making an "as applied" challenge. 
b. The 2009 Amendment to Idaho Code§ 31-857 Does Not Violate 
Procedural Due Process. 
The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment "prohibits deprivation oflife, 
liberty, or property without 'fundamental fairness' through governmental conduct that offends 
the community's sense of justice, decency and fair play." Maresh v. State, Dept. of Health and 
Welfare ex rel. Caballero, 132 Idaho 221, 225-226, 970 P.2d 14, 18-19 (1998) (additional 
citations omitted). Furthermore, "due process is not a concept rigidly applied to every 
adversarial confrontation, but instead is a flexible concept calling for such procedural protections 
as are warranted by the particular situation." Id at 226, 970 P .2d at 19. (Additional citations 
omitted). 
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For purposes of determining whether an individual's due process rights under the 
Fourteenth Amendment have been violated, a court must engage in a two-step analysis. Id. It 
must first decide whether the individual's threatened interest is a liberty or property interest 
under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. (Additional citations omitted). 
Only after a court finds a liberty or property interest will it reach the next step of analysis, 
in which it determines what process is due. Id. (Additional citations omitted). 
Whether a property interest exists can be determined only by an examination of the 
particular statute or ordinance in question. Id. (Additional citations omitted.) A person must 
have more than an abstract need or desire for a benefit in order to have a property interest therein. 
Id. at 227, 970 P.2d at 20. (Additional citations omitted.) Further, that person must have more 
than a unilateral expectation in the benefit; instead, she must have a "legitimate claim of 
entitlement to it." Id. (Additional citations omitted.) 
"The Fourteenth Amendment's procedural protection of property is a safeguard of the 
security of interests that a person has already acquired in specific benefits." Id. at 226, 970 P.2d 
at 19, citing Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972). 
Examples of potentially protected property interests include drivers' licenses, welfare 
benefits, unemployment insurance, homestead exemptions, Social Security, workers' 
compensation and medical licenses. See, Ides, Allan and Christopher N. May, Examples & 
Explanations: Constitutional Law - Individual Rights, 2nd Ed., Aspen Law & Business, 2001. 
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Piercy has failed to support his argument that open range status is a clearly protected 
property interest requiring due process before its deprived. He has cited no authority for that 
position. 
It is obvious that the "right" for one's cattle to "roam free" is not a property right at all. 
Piercy has a property right in his cattle, and in his land where they are pastured. Piercy has no 
more of a property right in open range than he does to drive 30 miles per hour on a street with a 
speed limit now set at 20 miles per hour. 
Furthermore, title 25, chapter 24, Idaho Code demonstrates there is no such constitutional 
right because it grants counties the right to create herd districts. See Idaho Code § 25-2401. The 
statutes do not entitle Piercy to certain benefits, nor do they create an expectation that property is 
open range. Piercy has no legitimate claim of entitlement to open range property status. 
Consequently, he does not have a property interest protected by the constitution. 
Even assuming Piercy does have a protected property interest, Piercy has failed to show 
the statutes providing notice and an opportunity to be heard violate due process. Rather, Piercy 
asserts the 2009 amendment to Idaho Code § 31-857 somehow violates the statutory provision 
regarding notice and an opportunity to be heard. This argument is flawed. 
It is well established that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not 
prohibit a state from attaching reasonable time limitations to the assertion of federal 
constitutional rights. Martinez v. State, 130 Idaho 530, 534, 944 P.2d 127, 131 (Ct. App.1997) 
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(additional citations omitted). The test is whether the defendant has had "a reasonable 
opportunity to have the issue as to the claimed right heard and determined." Id. (Additional 
citations omitted.) 
The current statute of limitations for a challenge to the validity of an ordinance is four ( 4) 
years pursuant to Idaho Code § 5-224. The 2009 amendment expanded the statute of limitations 
to seven (7) years. Even applied retroactively, four or seven years is more than a reasonable 
amount of time in which to pursue a claim for relief. See Martinez, 130 Idaho at 535, 944 P.2d at 
132 (reaffirming that a one year statute of limitations is a reasonable amount of time within 
which to file an application for post-conviction relief.) 
Therefore, there is no merit to Piercy's argument that retroactive application ofldaho 
Code § 31-587 is a procedural due process violation. 
c. The 2009 Amendment to Idaho Code§ 31-857 Does Not Violate 
Substantive Due Process. 
The United States and Idaho Constitutions protect against state deprivation of a person's 
"life, liberty, or property, without due process oflaw." Idaho Dairymen's Ass'n, Inc. v. Gooding 
County, 148 Idaho 653, 661, 227 P.3d 907, 915 (2010), citing U.S. Const. Amend. XIV,§ 1; 
Idaho Const. Art. 1, § 13. In order to prevail on a substantive due process claim, the state action 
that deprives a person of life, liberty, or property must be arbitrary, capricious, or without a 
rational basis. Idaho Dairymen's Ass'n Inc., 148 Idaho at 661, 227 P.3d at 915, citing Pace v. 
Hymas, 111Idaho581, 586, 726 P.2d 693, 698 (1986). Conversely, a substantive due process 
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violation will not be found if the state action "bears a reasonable relationship to a permissible 
legislative objective." Id., citing McNeely v. State, 119 Idaho 182, 189, 804 P.2d 911, 918 
(Ct.App.1990) (citing State v. Reed, 107 Idaho 162, 167, 686 P.2d 842, 847 (Ct.App.1984)). 
Piercy' s claim the 2009 amendment to Idaho Code § 31-857 violates substantive due 
process is without merit. 
As argued above, there is no evidence or case law supporting Piercy's claim that he has a 
constitutionally protected property interest. 
Additionally, Piercy has made no showing that the 2009 amendment to Idaho Code § 31-
857 is "arbitrary, capricious, or without a rational basis." To the contrary, the basis for the 
amendment is plainly rational, as it prevents individuals from challenging decades old herd 
districts that have been in existence for decades for alleged procedural irregularities in their 
enactment. The 2009 amendment to Idaho Code § 31-857 bears a reasonable relationship to a 
permissible legislative objective. 
The 2009 amendment precludes a challenge to the proceedings or jurisdictional steps 
preceding certain orders of the board of county commissioners after seven (7) years from the date 
of the order. The purpose of the amendment, as discussed in greater detail above, is to protect 
existing school, road, herd, or other districts from stale claims. Similar to the facts of this case, 
many of these districts have been in existence for decades. A challenge to the creation of such 
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districts would require review of evidence that through the passage of time no longer exists due 
to destruction or death, and/or reliance on faded memories. 
Therefore, the amendment is valid because the government has sufficient reason to avoid 
stale claims. Furthermore, the expressed legislative purpose of the 2009 amendment is to 
"eliminate unreasonably delayed legal challenges to the procedures sued by the County 
Commission after seven years have passed, the districts are in place and have been relied upon by 
the citizens and the county." See Statement of Purpose, Idaho Code § 31-587. Such purpose 
clearly bears a reasonable relationship to a permissible legislative objective. 
Finally, it is well-established the legislature may establish statutes oflimitations. See, 
e.g., Stuart, 149 Idaho 35, 232 P.3d 813 (2010). Because such authority is vested in the 
legislature, there cannot be a substantive due process violation. 
7. There is No Basis for Piercy's Requested "Correction" of the Court's 
Findings. 
Piercy argues that Judge Ford "misstated" facts in ruling on Piercy's opportunity to be 
heard. See Appellant's Brief, pp. 33-36. The issues raised in this section are nowhere to be 
found in Piercy's Notice of Appeal or Amended Notice of Appeal. (See R., pp. 1426-1436 
(Notice of Appeal) and pp. 1437-1447 (Amended Notice of Appeal). 
Piercy has presented this Court with no authority for his request that this Court "correct" 
Judge Ford's factual conclusions, none of which have any bearing on the issue of whether 
Piercy's challenge to the 1982 herd district is barred by the statute oflimitations. Nor are Judge 
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Ford's conclusions "relevant" to "Mr. Piercy's constitutional and substantive arguments." See 
Appellant's Brief, p. 36. Certainly Piercy must do more than just state conclusions. He has not 
explained how these facts are relevant to his procedural and substantive due process claims, nor 
provided any authority to the Court that would permit it to correct what Piercy contends are 
errors in the district's court's factual conclusions. 
Accordingly, this Court should reject Piercy's invitation. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Idaho Legislature has answered the question of how long is too long to challenge a 
herd district with the answer "7 years." Before it amended Idaho Code § 31-587 in 2009, the 
answer to the question was "four years" under Idaho Code § 5-224. This Court should not open 
the Pandora's Box of permitting civil defendants to avoid civil liability by collaterally attacking 
the process by which laws that have applied to them for decades were passed. 
DATED this _l1t day of March, 2013. 
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